Abstract. In discrete logarithm based cryptography, a method by Pohlig and Hellman allows solving the discrete logarithm problem efficiently if the group order is known and has no large prime factors. The consequence is that such groups are avoided. In the past, there have been proposals for cryptography based on cyclic infrastructures. We will show that the Pohlig-Hellman method can be adapted to certain cyclic infrastructures, which similarly implies that certain infrastructures should not be used for cryptography. This generalizes a result by Müller, Vanstone and Zuccherato for infrastructures obtained from hyperelliptic function fields.
Introduction
Since the advent of cryptographic protocols such as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol and ElGamal encryption, the security of many cryptographic protocols is based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem: given h, an element of a finite cyclic group g , find an integer n ∈ N such that g n = h. In 1978, S. C. Pohlig and M. E. Hellman [20] presented an algorithm which allows to quickly solve the discrete logarithm problem in a finite cyclic group if the group order |G| has a known factorization into a product of relatively small primes (see Section 4 for more details). Since then, one prefers to use groups of (almost) prime order or groups whose order has at least one large prime factor for discrete logarithm based cryptography, to avoid this kind of attack.
In 1990, R. Scheidler, J. A. Buchmann and H. C. Williams described a key exchange [5, 23] , which was not based on cyclic groups but on a structure first introduced by D. Shanks in 1972 [28] , called the infrastructure of a real quadratic number field. This structure behaves similar to finite cyclic groups, with the main difference that the operation corresponding to multiplication is not associative. This structure was generalized from real quadratic number fields to arbitrary number fields of unit rank one [6] , and also to real quadratic function fields [33, 30, 32] and more general function fields [25, 22] . Moreover, the key exchange protocol for infrastructures was refined [13, 12] and extended to real quadratic function fields [26, 10] . The security of these protocols is mostly based on the fact that computing distances in infrastructures in general is assumed to be hard. As the problem of computing distances in infrastructures is related (see Section 5) to the problem of computing discrete logarithms in finite cyclic groups, one has to ask the question whether the idea of Pohlig-Hellman can be applied in this setting.
In 1998, V. Müller, S. Vanstone and R. Zuccherato [18] answered this question positively in the case of infrastructures obtained from real quadratic function fields of characteristic 2. We will generalize this to obtain a positive answer for a more general class of infrastructures, which includes all infrastructures obtained from function fields. Then, we will argue why this is probably not possible for infrastructures obtained from number fields, at least without further input.
In Section 2, we will define the concept of a cyclic infrastructure and show how such infrastructures can be obtained from certain global function fields with two infinite places. After that, in Section 3, we will show how to obtain cyclic groups from such infrastructures and how to efficiently compute in them, assuming that one can efficiently compute in the underlying infrastructure. In Section 4, we will recall how the Pohlig-Hellman method works, and in Section 5 we will show how Pohlig-Hellman can be applied in the case of discrete cyclic infrastructures. Then, in Section 6 we will describe an algorithm to test whether the main requirement of the Pohlig-Hellman method, namely that the group order is smooth, is satisfied. Finally, in Section 7, we will discuss the number field case, and in Section 8, we will explain the consequences for cyclic infrastructure based cryptography.
Cyclic infrastructures
In this section, we define an abstract version of a cyclic infrastructure. This definition, including the description of baby steps and giant steps, is based on the interpretation of Shanks' infrastructure in context of a 'circle group' by H. W. Lenstra [15] , even though he uses a different distance function.
Roughly speaking, a cyclic infrastructure can be interpreted as a circle with a finite set of points on it.
Definition 2.1. Let R ∈ R >0 be a positive real number. A cyclic infrastructure (X, d) of circumference R is a non-empty finite set X with an injective map d : X → R/RZ, called the distance function. Definition 2.2. We say that a cyclic infrastructure (X, d) of circumference R is discrete if R ∈ Z and d(X) ⊆ Z/RZ.
One can interpret finite cyclic groups as discrete cyclic infrastructures as follows: Let G = g be a finite cyclic group of order m and d : G → Z/mZ be the discrete logarithm map 1 (to the base g), i.e. we have g d(h) = h for every h ∈ g . By interpreting Z/mZ as a subset of R/mZ, we get that (G, d) is a discrete cyclic infrastructure of circumference m. An infrastructure has two operations, namely baby steps and giant steps. For their definition, we need the following notation: Definition 2.3. Let R ∈ R >0 and let x, y ∈ R/RZ. Write x =x + RZ and y =ŷ + RZ withx,ŷ ∈ R such thatx ≤ŷ <x + R. Define
If one interprets R/RZ as a circle with circumference R, and x and y as points on this circle, the set [x, y] can be interpreted as the points on the circle which lie on the arc beginning at x and ending at y. Now we can define baby steps and giant steps. We will exclude the case |X| = 1, as in this case the infrastructure is trivial and not of practical interest.
Then there is a unique bijective fixed point free map bs : X → X such that for every x ∈ X, we have
This map is called baby step map. (b) Moreover, there is a unique map gs : X × X → X such that for every x, y ∈ X, we have
This map is called giant step map.
Let G = g be a finite cyclic group of order n > 1 and let d : G → Z/nZ be the discrete logarithm map. Then, for the cyclic infrastructure (G, d), we have bs(h) = gh and gs(h,
. This shows that baby and giant steps in arbitrary infrastructures generalize the group operation of a finite cyclic group.
In the case of finite cyclic groups, both baby steps and giant steps are basically the same operation. In arbitrary infrastructures, this is not the case, as in general there is no element x ∈ X with gs(x, y) = bs(y) for all y ∈ X.
In general, cyclic infrastructures behave similar to cyclic groups, with the main difference being that the giant step operation is not necessarily associative, but "almost" associative in the sense that
Here, "≈" for elements in R/RZ means that both sides have representatives in R which are relatively close to each other.
We want to close this section by showing how to obtain discrete cyclic infrastructures from certain global function fields. Let F q be a finite field with q elements and K = F q (x, y) a finite separable extension of F q (x), x transcendental over F q , such that F q is relatively algebraically closed in K. Let O be the integral closure of F q [x] in K, and assume that the degree valuation of F q (x) has exactly two extensions to K; these are the infinite places p 1 and p 2 of K. Let ν i : K → Z ∪ {∞} be the normalized valuation associated to p i , i = 1, 2. 
We say that a principal fractional ideal a ∈ PId(K) is reduced if 1 ∈ a and, for every a ∈ a \ {0} with ν i (a) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, we must have a ∈ F * q . Denote the set of all reduced principal fractional ideals by Red(K). Now one has that d := D| Red(K) is injective, 3 which, in particular, shows that X := Red(K) is finite. Therefore, (X, d) is a discrete cyclic infrastructure.
In certain cases, namely real quadratic (i.e. real hyperelliptic) function fields [33, 32, 11] and for certain cubic function fields of unit rank one [25, 22] , we can efficiently compute baby steps, inverse baby steps and giant steps (i.e. given x, y ∈ X, we can compute bs(x), bs −1 (x) and gs(x, y)), and we can efficiently compute relative distances
One further fundamental property of these infrastructures is that computation of d is hard, i.e. given x ∈ X, it is hard to compute the absolute distance d(x) except for a few special values of x. Moreover, R itself does not need to be known. This allows to do cryptography in infrastructures, as for doing cryptography, one must be able to efficiently compute certain objects (here: baby steps, giant steps and relative distances), while inverse computations (here: computing absolute distances) must be hard.
Obtaining cyclic groups from discrete cyclic infrastructures
Our aim is to embed a cyclic infrastructure into a one-dimensional torus and to describe arithmetic on the torus using the arithmetic of the infrastructure, i.e. by using giant and baby steps. More precisely, we embed the infrastructure into R/RZ or Z/RZ by adding the missing elements that are not in the infrastructure. One way to describe these missing elements are f -representations.
In the number field case, another embedding and representation has been first described by H. W. Lenstra in [15] ; a more general and more modern approach can be found in [27] . 2 If one drops this assumption, one cannot show that one has 'enough' reduced ideals, which makes computation of baby and giant steps problematic. One has to use another definition of reduced ideals, and define an equivalence relation on the set of all reduced ideals to make d injective.
3
, we assume k = 0 without loss of generality. Now
is reduced. 4 From now on, we will interpret these relative distances as real numbers instead of elements of R/RZ, by identifying them with their smallest non-negative representative, i.e. we identify a + RZ with a if 0 ≤ a < R.
Let (X, d) be a cyclic infrastructure of circumference R.
Note that infrastructures obtained from function fields, as described in Section 2, are discrete. One can also obtain infrastructures from number fields of unit rank one by a very similar method (for details, see [6] ), but these are never discrete (see Section 7).
Then we have the following proposition:
gives a bijection between the set of f -representations and R/RZ. If (X, d) is discrete, this restricts to a bijection
can be computed efficiently using baby steps by starting with (x, f ) and minimizing f :
is an f -representation and we are done. (4) Otherwise, replace (x, f ) by (x ′′ , f − ∆ ′ ) and continue with step (2).
One quickly sees that all operations do not modify the distance d(x, f ). In case (X, d) is discrete, one needs at most |f | (inverse) baby step computations.
Using this remark, we get the following proposition:
By the previous remark, it corresponds to a unique
The relationships between these structures are described in the following diagram:
Therefore, if we are able to effectively compute bs, bs −1 and gs and relative distances for an infrastructure (X, d), we can efficiently compute in a group isomorphic to R/RZ or Z/RZ, even if R is unknown and without the need to evaluate the function d for general elements of X. More precisely: 
, we have that f ′′ decreases resp. increases at least by d min . Hence, we can do at most 2dmax dmin baby steps resp. dmax dmin inverse baby steps before f ′′ gets negative resp. positive.
is obtained from a function field as described at the end of Section 2, it is an easy application of the Riemann-Roch Theorem [34, p. 28 
Remark 2. In case we want to compute in Rep f (X, d) (which is, for example, necessary if (X, d) is not discrete), we need to work with (arbitrary) real numbers. As this is not possible on computers, one needs to approximate them using floating point numbers. More details on this can be found in [9] and [13] ; there, such representations are called CRIAD-representations resp. (f, p)-representations.
Finally, we want to note that in the case of real hyperelliptic function fields, a similar representation has been used by S. Paulus and H.-G. Rück in [19] to describe the arithmetic in the Jacobian. This, together with the discussion in [11] , shows that in this case, our group Z/RZ is in fact the subgroup of the Jacobian which is generated by the divisor class of p 1 − p 2 . This is also true for non-hyperelliptic function fields under the assumption that deg p 1 = deg p 2 = 1.
Pohlig-Hellman in groups
Before explaining how to do Pohlig-Hellman in discrete infrastructures in Section 5, we want to recall the Pohlig-Hellman method for finite cyclic groups.
Assume that we have a finite cyclic group G = g of order m and an element h ∈ G. We can consider the discrete logarithm problem, which states that one wants to find some n ∈ N with g n = h.
Note that n is unique modulo m. Assume that the prime factorization
with distinct primes p 1 , . . . , p t and positive integers e 1 , . . . , e t ∈ N >0 is known. To compute n, note that by the Chinese Remainder Theorem,
To compute n mod p ei i , we successively compute n mod p ℓ i , ℓ = 1, . . . , e i , by considering the discrete logarithm problem
where n mod p ℓ i is sought. As we assume that we already know n mod p ℓ−1 i , we only have to solve the discrete logarithm problem
where n ′ ∈ {0, . . . , p i − 1}, to obtain
Assuming that we are using a method for solving discrete logarithms for elements of prime order p which needs O( √ p) group operations (according to [29] , this is optimal if one assumes that G behaves like a generic group), the running time of Pohlig-Hellman is
group operations.
Pohlig-Hellman in discrete infrastructures
Assume that (X, d) is a discrete infrastructure of circumference R ∈ Z. We have seen that this gives rise to a finite set Rep f discrete (X, d) of R elements, which can be equipped with the structure of a cyclic group. In the following, we will write this group additively, i.e. the group operation will be + and instead of exponentiation, we will use scalar multiplication.
We further assume that R together with an element (x, f ) ∈ Rep f discrete (X, d) is known where d(x, f ) = d(x) + f is known and small. 5 Using baby steps and inverse 5 We call an element r ∈ R/RZ small if we can write r =r + RZ withr small.
baby steps, we can compute an f -representation (
from this (compare Remark 1). Then we have Rep
In the group (Rep f discrete (X, d), +) we can consider the discrete logarithm problem
where (x ′′ , f ′′ ) ∈ Rep f discrete (X, d) and n ∈ Z. In particular, as d(x ′ , f ′ ) = 1, we have that d(x ′′ , f ′′ ) = n + RZ, whence solving the discrete logarithm problem for an element in X is equivalent to computing a distance of an element in X.
As we can effectively compute the group operation in Rep f discrete (X, d), we can employ any algorithm for computing discrete logarithms in groups to find n and, in particular, as we know the group order, we can employ the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm.
Assume that the prime factorization
with distinct primes p 1 , . . . , p t and positive integers e 1 , . . . , e t ∈ N >0 is known. We have seen in Section 4 that in order to find n, we need to solve the discrete logarithm problems
for n ′ for i = 1, . . . , t and ℓ = 1, . . . , e i ; this is Equation (1) transcribed to our setting. Note that we know that the order of
In particular, there is no need to compute inverses, if one rewrites Equation (2) as
As in Section 4, we get that the running time of Pohlig-Hellman is 
with t ′ ≥ t. In this case, we haveê i ≥ e i for each i ≤ t. If one applies Pohlig-Hellman with R ′ instead of R, i.e. by replacing the e i 's by theê i 's, the algorithm will return the same value of n, as for ℓ > e i , the solution of Equation (2) is found for one instance of Equation (2), we have (
, it is enough to know an integer multiple of R gcd(ℓ,R) , where ℓ ∈ Z is any integer with
Testing for smooth circumference
With respect to the result from last section, it is desirable to check whether a given discrete cyclic infrastructure (X, d) with circumference R satisfies that R is B-smooth, i.e. that all prime divisors of R are ≤ B, for some integer B ∈ N. In practice, in particular when using a discrete cyclic infrastructure for cryptographic reasons, it can happen that R is not known. In this section, we present an algorithm which still allows to check whether R is B-smooth. (Also see the discussion following Question 1 in Section 8, where the smoothness of the regulator of a randomly chosen function field is discussed.)
For this, we make the following requirements:
(1) we know some (x, f ) ∈ Rep f discrete (X, d) with d(x, f ) = 1; (2) we know an upper bound R ′ for R; (3) for every (
). For discrete cyclic infrastructures obtained from unit rank one function fields as described in Section 2, these requirements are always satisfied. Assume that K is such a function field with full field of constants F q and genus g. Then we have that: 
Note that this bound is rather crude; for example, for real quadratic function fields of Richaud-Degert type, the regulator is very small. Our method is formulated in the following lemma:
Lemma 6.1. Let p 1 , . . . , p t be all primes ≤ B, and define
Proof. Firstly, note that R is B-smooth if, and only if, R | m, as R ≤ R ′ . Secondly, the cyclic group Rep f discrete (X, d) is generated by (x, f ) and has order R, whence m · (x, f ) is the identity (i.e. has distance 0) if, and only if, m is an integer multiple of R.
Note that our method is very similar to the computations done in J. Pollard's (p − 1)-method [17, p. 93, Algorithm 3.14] or in H. W. Lenstra's Elliptic Curve Method for Factorization [14] .
Remark 3. To evaluate m · (x, f ), one can proceed iteratively, as it is usually done in Pollard's (p − 1)-method and in Lenstra's Elliptic Curve Method:
Define (x 0 , f 0 ) := (x, f ) and
consecutive multiplications of (x i−1 , f i−1 ) by p i . Therefore, to compute m · (x, f ) using this method, one needs
group operations in Rep f (X, d), assuming a square-and-multiply technique is used for multiplication by p i .
In the case of infrastructures obtained from function fields, we get:
) is a discrete infrastructure of circumference R obtained from a function field (as in Section 2) of genus g with full field of constants F q , then one needs at most O(tg log q) giant step and O(tg 2 log q) baby step computations to check whether R is p t -smooth, where p t is the t-th prime number.
Pohlig-Hellman and infrastructures based on number fields
In the case that K is a number field of unit rank one, i.e. with two places at infinity, one can construct a cyclic infrastructure basically the same way as for function fields with two places at infinity. This is, for example, described in [6] . In the number field case, O is the integral closure of Z in K, and F * q is replaced by the roots of unity in K. The places at infinity correspond to the (non-conjugate) embeddings K → C; if the two embeddings are σ 1 and σ 2 , the condition that deg σ i = 1 for one i corresponds to σ i (K) ⊆ R. Moreover, the valuations ν i are defined by ν i (x) := − log |σ i (x)|, x ∈ K * . Let (X, d) be the resulting infrastructure. Note that if α ∈ K * , then |σ i (α)| is algebraic over Q and, hence, ν i (α) is transcendental over Q by Lindemann's Theorem if ν i (α) = 0. Therefore, in particular, neither R nor any element of d(X), except 0, is a rational number, whence (X, d) is far from being discrete.
Let x ∈ O \ {0}. We want to investigate when
x is reduced, this implies that x q ε p is a root of unity, i.e. is equal to ±1, i.e. we have that x q = ±ε p . But then, we have
whence our assumption x ∈ O implies that x ∈ O * . This is the main ingredient of the following result: 
+f +RZ is an isomorphism, (a, 0) having finite order means that
∈ Q. By the discussion before the lemma, this implies x ∈ O * , whence
As the Pohlig-Hellman method (or any other of the standard discrete logarithm problem solvers) requires an element of finite order (of which an integer multiple has to be known in the case of the Pohlig-Hellman method), we cannot directly apply the Pohlig-Hellman method to (a, 0) ∈ Rep f (X, d), but have to find a positive real number f ∈ R and an f -representation (b,
). This of course opens the question how to find such an f , if one does not already know d(a) and R. Obviously, if one knows d(a) in advance, there is no need to apply the Pohlig-Hellman method to compute d(a). Hence, one has to find f without this information, or one has to adjust the Pohlig-Hellman method to circumvent this problem.
Finally, as Lenstra used a different distance function in the case that K is a real quadratic number field [15] , we want to investigate whether with his distance function, a Pohlig-Hellman variant is possible. Let K be a real quadratic number field and let σ be the unique non-trivial automorphism of K.
Instead of using the distance −ν 1 (x) + RZ, Lenstra uses
Without loss of generality, assume q = 1, i.e. we have By this argumentation, we have the same problems implementing Pohlig-Hellman using this distance function as in the case of the other distance function.
Conclusion
There exist several cryptosystems employing discrete cyclic infrastructures; for examples of such, see [4, 23, 26, 13, 12, 10] . They are all based on the hardness of computing distances: if (X, d) is a cyclic infrastructure, these systems require that it is hard to compute d(x) for a general x ∈ X. Note that this is equivalent to computing d(x, 0) for (x, 0) ∈ Rep f (X, d). Now assume that (X, d) is discrete with circumference R, and that an integer multiple R ′ of R is known. Moreover, assume that R ′ is smooth, i.e. that R ′ factors with relatively small prime factors. If baby, inverse baby and giant steps and relative distances can be computed efficiently, we can use the Pohlig-Hellman method described in Section 5 to compute d(x, 0) relatively fast. Hence, in order for cryptosystems which are based on the hardness of computing absolute distances in discrete cyclic infrastructures to be safe, one has to use discrete infrastructures such that (a) either it is very hard to compute a multiple R ′ of R which can be factorized, (b) or R is not smooth, i.e. has at least one very large prime factor.
In (a), it may even be enough that only a part of R ′ can be factorized, if this part is still a multiple of R: assume that R ′ factors as R 1 R 2 , where R 1 is smooth, i.e. has small prime factors, but R 2 has only very large prime factors. Then it still might be that R 2 is not needed for computing d(x): one computes R 1 · (O, 1), and if it equals (O, 0), one can take R 1 instead of R. If one knows that R is smooth, R will be a divisor of R 1 and we will have R 1 · (O, 1) = (O, 0).
To avoid the possibility that the Pohlig-Hellman method can be used, one has to use function fields whose regulator is not B-smooth for a "large enough" B. A naïve way to find such function fields is to randomly pick a function field (with two places at infinity, one of them of degree one) and to apply the algorithm from Section 6 to check whether the regulator is B-smooth; this procedure is repeated until a sufficient curve is found.
This leads to several important questions:
(1) How smooth is the regulator of an average function field with two places at infinity, one of them of degree one?
In [26, 
, this shows that R is large with high probability. More importantly, the smoothness of R is more or less equivalent to the smoothness of Pic 0 Fq (K) under the assumption of these heuristics. An equivalent to the Cohen-Lenstra heuristics for quadratic number fields is the heuristics by E. Friedman and L. C. Washington [8] for quadratic function fields. The main difference to the number field case is that for function fields, these have been proven (in a slightly modified version) by J. D. Achter [1] in certain cases. In our case, an older result by J. D. Achter and J. Holden [2] already gives sufficient information. Let ℓ be a prime which is coprime to q. Then, by [2, Lemma 3.3] , the proportion of real hyperelliptic function fields K of genus g over F q for which ℓ ∤ Pic (mod q). This is slightly less than the probability that a random natural number in the interval [( √ q−1) 2g , ( √ q+1) 2g ] is not divisible by ℓ, which is approximately 1− 1 ℓ . Therefore, one expects that R is B-smooth with a slightly higher probability than that a random natural number in the interval [( √ q − 1) 2g , ( √ q + 1) 2g ] is B-smooth, which is rather low for B ≪ q g . A more straightforward approach to the problem of finding function fields whose regulator is not B-smooth would be to ask the following question:
(2) Can one efficiently construct function fields with two places at infinity, one of them of degree one, such that the regulator is known to have a very large prime factor?
More generally, one can also ask the following question:
(3) Given an arbitrary positive integer R, can one efficiently construct a function field with two places at infinity, one of them of degree one, which has regulator R, or R · ℓ with ℓ ∈ N small?
In the case of real elliptic function fields, this is basically equivalent to finding an elliptic curve together with a rational point of order R, as it is explained in [31] : if E is an elliptic curve over F q with the point ∞ at infinity, and if P ∈ E(F q ) \ {∞}, one can transform the equation of E such that one obtains a function field with two places at infinity, which correspond to the two points P and ∞ of E. Moreover, the regulator of this new function field is exactly the order of P , and the reduced principal ideals correspond to the multiples of P . For hyperelliptic function fields, one has a similar correspondence; see [19] . Currently, elliptic or hyperelliptic curves (or, more precisely, their imaginary function field counterparts K) with a specific number of points (i.e. elements in Pic 0 Fq (K)) are usually constructed using complex multiplication, or by choosing curves from very special families of curves (see, for example, [7] ). It is currently not known whether there are special attacks for these classes of curves.
A final question arises from the fact that there are also proposals for cyclic infrastructure based cryptography for infrastructures obtained from number fields (for examples, see [5, 23, 13, 12] ). In the previous section, we have seen that the Pohlig-Hellman method cannot be applied in the number field case in its current state. Therefore, one can ask the following: (4) Can a similar method be applied to cyclic infrastructures obtained from number fields, or generally to non-discrete cyclic infrastructures?
So far, the author is not aware of any idea of whether this question can be answered positively.
